WebbIf we adopt the theory of temporal parts, the Problem of Temporary Intrinsics disappears as long as there is not something maintaining its identity through time and undergoing a change over time. The first solution does not deny the second hypothesis, which is to be considered vacuously true. As a number of philosophers have remarked, one of the many puzzlesabout identity, given its apparent simplicity, is why it proves … Visa mer In the introduction we encountered one type of puzzle about identityacross time: the case of Cup and Tcup. The puzzle arose because … Visa mer Here are two examples of identity statements: (i) and (ii) are contingent. Even if the table in the next room is myfavorite table, it might not have been. Even if the table in the nextroom is the one you purchased last … Visa mer Personal identity is perhaps the most extensively discussed specialcase of identity. What is it for a person existing at one time to beidentical to a person existing at another? This question was firstclearly posed by … Visa mer
The Problem of Temporary Intrinsics 1. The problem
Webbtemporary intrinsics is his “first solution”: that shapes and other seemingly intrinsic properties “are disguised relations, which an enduring thing may bear to times.”4 There is … Webb15 mars 2010 · This article presents, explains, and defends the temporal parts solution to the problem of change. Hinchliff, Mark. ‘The Puzzle of Change.’Philosophical Perspectives 10 (1996): 119–36. This article presents, explains, and defends the presentist solution to the problem of change. Wasserman, Ryan. ‘The Argument from Temporary Intrinsics.’ can be divided
Teaching & Learning Guide for: The Problem of Change
Webb6 okt. 2011 · problem of temporary intrinsics;pre-theoretic beliefs, trees, people, or chairs, changing their properties;opponents of endurantism, that ordinary things endure;ordinary things, persisting at... Webbhe present book and its companion volume The Tensed Theory of Time: a T Critical Examination are an attempt to adjudicate what one recent discussant has called "the most fundamental question in the philosophy of time," namely, "whether a static or a dynamic conception ofthe world is correct. "] I had originally intended to treat this question ... Webb1 mars 2010 · All these attempts are undermined by an assumption essential to the problem of temporary intrinsics, to wit, that there are many moments of time and all have the same ontological status. As long as this assumption is maintained, the only solution to the problem is that familiar, concrete objects perdure. fishing competition fraud